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Abstract
The aim of this paper is to explore the ways in which Axiomatic Reconstructions of Quantum
Theory in terms of Information-Theoretic principles (ARQITs) can contribute to explaining and
understanding  quantum  phenomena,  as  well  as  to  study  their  explanatory  limitations.  This  is
achieved in part by offering an account of the kind of explanation that axiomatic reconstructions of
quantum theory provide,  and re-evaluating  the  epistemic  status  of  the  program in  light  of  this
explanation. As illustrative cases studies, I take Clifton's, Bub's and Halvorson's characterization
theorem and Popescu's and Rohrlich's toy models, and their explanatory contribution with respect to
quantum  non-locality.  On  the  one  hand,  I  argue  that  ARQITs can  aspire  to  provide  genuine
explanations  of  (some  aspects  of)  quantum non-locality.  On  the  other  hand,  I  argue  that  such
explanations cannot rule out a mechanical quantum theory.
Introduction
In  the  philosophy  of  science  literature,  causal  explanations  have  traditionally  been  of  high
import,  and  in  Quantum  Theory  (QT)  such  explanations  require  contending  with  ontological
questions. Given the well-known issues in the ontological interpretation of QT, such a requirement
has often been considered (by philosophers) an obstacle for the explanation of quantum phenomena.
In particular, such a requirement seems to be hardly compatible with the expectation of genuine
explanations produced by research programs that remain agnostic about to the ontology of QT. One
of  the  most  manifest  examples  of  this  difficulty  comes  from  the  program  of  axiomatic
reconstruction  of  QT.  Within  the  current  mainstream research  in  the  foundations  of  QT much
attention has been turned to this program, and in particular, to those reconstructions that focus on
information-theoretic principles (Clifton et al. 2003, Popescu and Rohrlich 1994, Popescu 2006,
Zeilinger 1999, Rovelli 1996). It is therefore becoming increasingly important for philosophers of
science  to  deal  with  the  explanatory  gain  that  is  implied  in  the  switch  from  the  traditional
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interpretation program to the program of Axiomatic Reconstruction of QT in terms of Information-
Theoretic principles (ARQIT).
The analysis proposed in this paper begins from the assumption that science provides many
varieties of explanation other than causal explanation and that some of these alternative kinds of
explanation  do  not  require  a  commitment  to  any  specific  ontology.  With  this  background
assumption in mind, I will examine some ways in which ARQIT can contribute to explaining and
understanding quantum phenomena, as well as describe their explanatory limitations.
I will therefore first offer an outline of an account of scientific explanation within the context of
ARQIT. Afterward I will investigate the legitimate role of ARQIT in the foundations of QT. The
literature abounds with thorough analyses about the role of quantum information theory and ARQIT
in the foundations of QT and the conclusions I will reach (spoiler: while ARQIT can contribute to
some traditional issues in the foundations of QT, it fails to address others. Also,  ARQIT does not
rule  out  the  possibility  or  necessity  of  a  traditional  interpretation  of  QT to  explain  such other
unsolved issues) are not new in the literature – they converge, for instance, with the analysis put
forward in (Timpson 2013) and partially with (Duwell 2007). What I take to be the novelty of the
approach I propose, however, is that it is specifically carried out within the domain of the theory of
scientific explanation.
As  a  concrete  illustration  of  how  these  theories  can  contribute  to  the  explanation  and
understanding  of  the  quantum  world,  I  analyse  the  accounts  ARQITs provide  of  non-locality,
defined minimally as quantum entanglement, yielding non-local quantum correlations in the sense
of Bell's theorem. Although the proposed analysis will be centred on two specific theories as case
studies, a good part of the analysis here proposed is grounded on generic features of ARQITs and
their explanations. For the most part, the conclusions I will reach can therefore be extended, mutatis
mutandis, to ARQIT in general. As will be shown, ARQIT provides novel and genuine explanations
of some aspects of non-locality, but it fails to address what is seen by most as the problem of non-
locality, i.e. the problem of how quantum correlations occur. The first case study (§ 2) comes from
the Clifton-Bub-Halvorson (CBH) reconstruction of QT (Clifton et al. 2003 Bub 2000, 2004, 2005),
which explains why there are non-local entangled states. The second case study (§ 3) comes from
partial  reconstructions  of  QT (Popescu  and  Rohrlich  1994,  Brassard  et  al.  2006,  Brunner  and
Skrzypczyk 2009), whose aim is to find an answer to the question 'why is our world only this much
non-local, and not more than that?'.
 § 4 is devoted to a pre-theoretic illustration of the kind of epistemic gain achievable with
ARQITs'  explanations.  In  this  section  I  will  make  explicit  some  central  features  for  which  a
successful model of explanation in ARQIT must account. To anticipate part of the contents of this
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section, I will argue that ARQIT addresses one of the central questions in the foundations of QT:
how does the quantum world differ from the classical one? Elaborating on the comparative kind of
understanding that ARQIT provide, I will conclude that ARQIT's explanation of (some aspects of)
non-locality corresponds to a very concrete and straightforward pre-theoretic sense of explanation,
i.e. that you explain a feature or a behaviour P of s by showing how P depends on the essence of s.
In § 5 I describe the bare bones of the proposed account of explanation in ARQIT, which will take
inspiration from Mark Steiner's (1978) account of explanatory proofs. Furthermore, I will anticipate
two possible  objections  to  the  proposed account  and show how such features  are  in  fact  non-
problematic.
In § 6 I provide two examples of how taking into account the specific explanatory work at play
within ARQIT might contribute with a new perspective to topics and debates in the foundations of
QT. As a  first  example  of  such a  contribution I  analyse the claim that the explanatory role  of
information shows that information has a special role in the ontology or interpretation of QT, and
argue that such a claim is unwarranted. As a second example, I analyse the claim that ARQIT rules
out  the  possibility  of  a  traditional  ontological  interpretation  of  QT  (and,  for  instance,  its
commitment to the reality of the collapse of the wave-function).  In contrast with such claims I
elaborate on the results of the previous sections and argue that, although ARQIT has the potential of
providing a  successful  explanation  of  some specific  aspects  of  quantum non-locality,  it  cannot
replace traditional ontological interpretations of QT. CBH – especially Bub – have promoted the
claim  that  ARQIT makes  traditional  interpretations  of  QT explanatorily  irrelevant.  Since  their
arguments have significantly informed the debate over such issues, a fair part of the discussion
proposed in this section is therefore devoted to them.
1. ARQIT: scopes and strategies
The  program of  axiomatic  reconstruction  of  QT departs  significantly  from the  aims  of the
interpretative program. Interpretations of QT typically aim at grounding the formalism of QT on
hypothetical  assumptions  about  the  constituents  of  the  quantum world  and  the  processes  they
undergo,  answering  the  question:  “how  could  the  world  be  such  that  it  behaves  the  way  QT
predicts?”. The focus and strategy of axiomatic reconstructions of QT is drastically different. They
aim at finding a few general physical principles from which,  once translated into mathematical
terms, one can formally derive the structure of QT:
“[t]heorems  and  major  results  of  physical  theory  are  formally  derived  from  simpler
mathematical assumptions. These assumptions or axioms, in turn, appear as a representation in the
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formal language of a set of physical principles.” (Grinbaum 2007, p. 389)
Principles “must be simple  physical statements, that is assertions, such that their meaning is
immediately,  easily  accessible  to  a  scientist’s  understanding.”  (ibid.,  p.  390)  In  the  absence  of
additional  assumptions,  the  function  of  principles  at  the  basis  of  axiomatic  reconstructions  is
uniquely of providing an axiomatic basis for the deduction of the rest of the theory, and “nothing
can be generally said about their ontological content or the ontic commitments that arise from these
principles”, since they “have only a minimal epistemic status of being postulated for the purpose of
reconstructing  the  theory  in  question.”  (ibid.,  p.  391).  Within  quantum  information  theory  in
general, and in ARQIT specifically, information is a physically defined quantity cashed out in terms
of the resources required to transmit messages – measured classically by Shannon entropy or in QT
by Von Neumann entropy.
2. The CBH characterization theorem
The CBH characterization theorem (Clifton et al. 2003) has long been the most discussed (by
philosophers) ARQIT, and many discussions about the philosophical significance of ARQIT focus
on  it.  The  CBH  theorem  presupposes  a  mathematical  framework  called  C*-algebra  which,
according to the authors, is neutral enough to allow a mathematically abstract characterization of a
physical theory that includes, as special cases, all classical mechanical theories of both wave and
particle  varieties,  and  all  variations  on  QT,  including  quantum  field  theories. Within  such  a
framework,  CBH  formulate  a  theorem  characterising  QT  in  terms  of  three  principles  about
impossibilities of information transfer:
The  impossibility  of  superluminal  information  transfer  between  two  physical  systems  by
performing measurements on one of them ('no superluminal information transfer'). This constraint
states that merely performing a local (non-selective)1 operation on a system S cannot convey any
information  to  a  physically  distinct  system.  This  constraint  corresponds  to  no  signalling  via
entanglement ('no signalling') featuring in ordinary quantum mechanics. 
The impossibility of perfectly broadcasting the information contained in an unknown physical
state ('no broadcasting').  Broadcasting is a generalization of the process of cloning – a process that
starts with a system in any arbitrary state   and ends up with two systems, both in the state  .
While cloning applies only to pure states, broadcasting generalizes also to mixed states, and, for
1 Selective measurements operations are obviously not considered here, given that selection changes the ensemble 
under study and therefore its statistics.  
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pure states, reduces to cloning. In quantum mechanics, broadcasting is possible for a set of states ρi
iff they are commuting. (Barnum et Al. 1996)
The  impossibility  of  unconditionally  secure  bit  commitment  ('no  bit-commitment').  The  bit-
commitment is a cryptographic protocol that guarantees a secure commitment to a particular value
by the first party, where that value is hidden from a second party. We can illustrate the protocol with
a simplifying analogy borrowed from Timpson (2013): in the first stage of the protocol, the first
party, Alice, writes 0 or 1 in a piece of paper, then she locks the piece of paper in a safe and gives it
to Bob. Bob cannot read the content of the information given by Alice until, at the second stage of
the process, she gives him the key of the safe. The protocol is said to be secure if neither Alice can
cheat by changing what she wrote in the paper after giving the safe to Bob, nor can Bob cheat by
reading the value written by Alice before she gives the key to him. A quantum version of the
protocol was invented by Bennett and Brassard (1984). In this version of the protocol Alice encodes
the 0 and 1 values into two mixtures represented by the same density operator. Given that the two
mixtures are indistinguishable, Bob must wait for Alice to tell him what procedure she used, in
order  to  'read'  the  value  to  which  she  committed.  However,  Alice  could  use  a  so-called  EPR
cheating strategy: she can give to Bob one of an entangled pair of particles, and keep the other. By
doing this, after giving the particle to Bob, she can change the value of Bob's particle by steering
Bob’s particle into the desired mixture via appropriate measurements on her particle. Bob cannot
reveal her cheating and this makes the protocol not secure.2
An important part of the CBH paper is devoted to the characterization of QT against classical
phase space theories. They first show that classical phase space theories correspond to commutative
(i.e. abelian) C*-algebras:
“not  only  does  every  classical  phase  space  presentation  of  a  physical  theory  define  a  C∗-
algebra,  but,  conversely,  behind  every  abstract  abelian  C∗-algebra  lurks  in  its  function
representation a  good old-fashioned classical  phase space  theory.  All  of this  justifies  treating a
theory formulated in C∗-algebraic language as classical just in case its algebra is abelian. It follows
that a necessary condition for thinking of a theory as a  quantum theory is that its  C∗-algebra be
non-abelian”. (Clifton et al. 2003, p.1568)
Later, they commit to showing that: i) “the ‘no superluminal information transfer’ condition
entails that the C∗-algebras A and B, whose self-adjoint elements represent the observables of [two
spacelike separated systems] A and B, commute with each other,” (ibid., p.1570) i.e., every element
of  A commutes  pairwise  with  every  element  of  B,  or,  in  other  words,  distinct  systems  are
2 Bub  stresses that a secure bit commitment is also impossible for classical systems, but as a consequence of the
impossibility in practice to guarantee the security of the protocol due to issues of computational complexity. “No
principle of classical mechanics precludes Bob from extracting this information.” (Bub 2005, p.553) 
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kinematically independent; and (ii) “the ‘no-broadcasting’ condition entails that A and B separately
are  non-commutative  (non-abelian).”  (ibid.)  i.e.  any individual  system’s  algebra  of  observables
must be non-commutative; non-commutativity of individual algebras is the formal representative of
the physical phenomenon of interference.
Finally, CBH show how quantum non-locality follows from these two joint algebraic features: 
“if  A and  B are  nonabelian  and  mutually  commuting  (and  C∗-independent),  it  follows
immediately that there are nonlocal entangled states on the C∗-algebra A ∨  B they generate” (ibid.).
More specifically, the explanation of non-locality follows three steps: 
1) from 'no superluminal information transfer follows that the commutativity of distinct
algebras is guaranteed: if the observables of distinct algebras commute, then the 'no-superluminal
information transfer' constraint holds. Commutativity of distinct algebras is meant to represent 'no
signalling'.  A theory violating this principle would display strong non-locality and superluminal
signalling;
2) from 'no broadcasting' follows the non-commutativity of individual algebras. Cloning is
always allowed by classical theories and if any two states can be (perfectly) broadcast, then the
algebra  is  commutative.  A theory  violating  this  principle  is  therefore  a  classical  theory  with
commutative individual algebras;
3) if  A and  B are two sub non-commutative and mutually commuting algebras, there are
nonlocal entangled states on the C∗-algebra A ∨ B they generate.
This was an outline of the account of non-locality provided by CBH. It  has to be noticed,
though, that CBH argue that such derivation is not sufficient to guarantee the existence of non-local
entangled states and that 'no bit-commitment' is also necessary. The justification CBH provide for
the introduction of the 'no bit-commitment' principle, however, remains dubious. In particular, we
have seen that in the context of C*-algebras, non-locality already follows from the conjunction of
'no broadcasting'  and 'no superluminal information transfer'.  CBH argue that in the context of a
weaker algebra (Segal algebra, for instance), these two principles might not be sufficient, and that
the role of 'no bit-commitment' is exactly to guarantee non-locality even in these cases. However,
while the 'no bit-commitment' principle is not necessary in the context of C*-algebras, there is no
proof that in the context of Segal algebra from the three principles non-locality follows. It is for this
reason that Timpson (2013) concludes that this principle is either redundant or inefficacious.
The choice of reconstructing the CBH explanation of non-local entanglement as following from
the first two principles only allows us to illustrate a feature of this explanation that will be very
useful in the following sections. A slightly technical digression on this point is therefore needed.
Various philosophers have objected to the CBH reconstruction that the choice of a C*-algebra might
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fail  to  represent  the  neutral  formal  framework  that  an  axiomatic  reconstruction  requires.  C*-
algebras, in fact, define states as linear functionals of observables, and this assumption rules out by
fiat  non-equilibrium  deterministic  hidden  variables  theories  (Timpson  2013,  ch.  8.3.2.2).  The
assumption of equilibrium is an additional assumption necessary to deterministic hidden variables
theories in order to reproduce the predictions of QT (without such an assumption, for instance, a
deterministic hidden variable theory might allow superluminal signalling). However, the fact that
C*-algebras  rule  out  by  fiat  the  possibility  of  non-equilibrium  leads  to  the  elimination  of  an
interesting class of theories – which, in turn, spoils the resulting characterization of QT. In fact, by
narrowing the range of theories against which QT is picked out, the formal background plays a
relevant role in selecting QT – a role that should exclusively be played by the information-theoretic
principles.3
3. Partial reconstructions of QT
In recent years partial reconstructions of QT in terms of information-theoretic principles have
been experiencing a vast  success,  and their  progress  in  the inquiry on quantum non-locality is
especially promising. The strategy here is quite different with respect to the one used in the CBH
reconstruction.  It  consists  in  building  models  of  'fantasy  quantum theories'  that  replicate  some
aspects of QT (i.e. that maintain some principles in common with QT), while changing some others.
The consequences of these modifications are then studied by manipulation of such toy models. This
makes it possible to investigate the logical structure of the theory and in particular, by changing one
principle of QT and seeing how one gets new characteristics in the models, to highlight which
principle is responsible for a given quantum feature, and how.
It  is  indeed  fascinating  and  instructive  to  see  how  this  strategy  has  led  to  important
achievements  in  the  discovery  and  explanation  of  surprising  features  of  quantum non-locality.
Notice that, as we are about to see, the explanandum chosen in this case study is not non-locality
itself,  but  the  fact  that  our  world  instantiates  a  particular  amount  of  non-locality  rather  than
somewhat more or somewhat less. The ground-breaking work in this research is represented by
(Popescu and Rohrlich 1994), which starts with the question:  “What is the quantum principle?”.
While  “[i]n  the  conventional  approach  to  quantum mechanics,  indeterminism is  an  axiom and
nonlocality is a theorem” Popescu and Rohrlich make “nonlocality an axiom and indeterminism a
theorem” (1994, p.379). This strategy is justified by the fact that “quantum nonlocality seems as
fundamental  as  ever”  and  “is  an  essential  feature  of  quantum  theory”  (ibid.,  p.  380).  The
3 For a different interesting illustration of the limits of the C*-algebra approach, see also (Myrvold 2000).
7
reconstruction starts therefore with two axioms: relativistic causality and non-locality – the first
axiom corresponding to 'no-signalling' and the second being analysed in the neutral definition of
non-local  correlations in  the sense of Bell's  theorem. The study proceeds then by investigating
which theories give rise to non-local correlations, while preserving causality. “Thus, our result is
completely independent of quantum mechanics or any particular model” (ibid., p. 381). The first
immediate result of such investigation is the deduction that the two axioms can be kept compatible
only in  a  non completely deterministic  QT. “Then a 'negative'  aspect  of quantum mechanics  –
indeterminacy and limits on measurements – appears as a consequence of a fundamental 'positive'
aspect: the possibility of nonlocal action” (ibid., p.380).
After such a set up, it becomes more and more clear how the study of quantum non-locality is a
central aim of the paper as much as the attempt of an axiomatization of QT. The paper in fact
continues with an investigation of what kind of correlations one can get, that are consistent with the
two principles,  put  forward  through the  manipulation  of  the  toy  models  defined  by these  two
principles.  Such toy  models  (which  are  now called  PR boxes,  after  the  authors)  consist  in  an
imaginary device composed by two black boxes, one of which is given to Alice, the other to Bob.
Both the experimenters can ask the box questions and receive answers, as the device has an input
and an output port for each one of them. For each input, Alice receives a uniformly distributed
random output and the same is the case for Bob; these outputs are non-locally correlated. However,
PR devices do not support superluminal signalling between Alice and Bob, as the probability of
Alice obtaining a given result a is independent of the question asked by Bob.
By playing with the possibilities provided by these PR boxes, Popescu and Rohrlich show that
quantum correlations are not the sole non-local correlations that are consistent with such a setup,
but that there exist  other, so-called 'post-quantum', correlations that can be more non-local than
quantum correlations4. In other words, quantum non-locality is not the sole kind of non-locality
allowed in a world where the two principles of non-locality and 'no signalling' hold.
This discovery has opened the door to a series of questions about non-locality: if post-quantum
correlations don't violate the 'no signalling' principle, why doesn't our world instantiate them? Why
is our world only  this  much non-local, when it  seems that it  could be more?5 It is this kind of
question that is therefore addressed by PR models' explanations. 
4 Here non-locality is measured as the amount of violation of Bell's inequalities.
5 From the point of view of someone used to the traditional interpretative questions, this question might seem odd.
The issue here, one could claim, is not why the world does not instantiate correlations more non-local than QT, but
how non-local correlations can even be possible! In considering this switch, however, don't forget that the possibility
of post-quantum correlations would have important implication for information processing tasks. It is, therefore,
essential to the achievement of the aims of this program to find out whether these correlations happen in our world,
and, if not, why.
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Building on Popescu’s and Rohrlich’s result,  later works (Brassard et al. 2006, Brunner and
Skrzypczyk 2009) suggest that the explanation of why our world only instantiates quantum non-
locality, and no more non-locality than that, lies in another information-processing principle. Let's
see how. 
The  availability  of  stronger  correlations  makes  communication  tasks  easier,  i.e.  such
correlations  allow  one  to  solve  communication  problems  with  the  use  of  less  resources.  For
instance, let's say that Alice and Bob have the task of calculating a Boolean function f(x, y), where x
is known only by Alice, and  y only by Bob. Obviously, in order to solve the problem they must
exchange  some  information.  However,  such  information  could  be  reduced  depending  on  the
availability of correlated systems shared by the two. It is, for instance, known that, in the calculation
of some functions, sharing a pair of entangled systems could reduce the amount of information to be
sent  from  one  wing  of  the  experiment  to  the  other  (Buhrman  et  al.  1988);  however,  for  the
calculation of some other functions (e.g. the inner product between two numbers) Alice will have to
send to Bob the same number of bits as her input, whether or not the experimenters share a quantum
entangled pair.
Brassard  et  al.  (2006)  have  therefore  shown that  correlations  that  are  more  non-local  than
quantum  correlations  would  make  any  communication  complexity  trivial,  i.e.  with  them,  any
Boolean function  could be  calculated  by  Alice  and Bob with  the  exchange of  only  one  bit  of
information. Finally, Brunner and Skrzypczyk (2009) have shown that the same happens with post-
quantum correlations that are arbitrarily close to classical correlations (i.e. arbitrarily close to the
limit imposed by Bell's inequalities). In short, Brunner and Skrzypczyk show that from such post-
quantum  correlations  it  is  possible  to  distil6 correlations  that  are  strong  enough  to  make
communication complexity trivial. The hope of the developers of this program is to show that this
result is generalizable to all post-quantum correlations.
This suggests a possible reason why we have only so much non-locality in the world, as “most
computer scientists would consider a world in which communication complexity is trivial to be as
surprising as a modern physicist would find the violation of causality.” (Brassard et al. 2006, p.2)
They therefore put forward the conjecture that the explanation of the existent limit  in the non-
locality of our world lies in a new information-theoretic axiom about the impossibility of trivial
communication complexity.
6 Distillation is a procedure that begins with a large number of weakly correlated systems and ends up with a smaller
number of strongly correlated systems, 'distilling' in this way non-locality.
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4. Preliminaries
At first sight it might be unclear in what sense the above discussed accounts are explanations. In
his 'manifesto' for axiomatic reconstructions of QT, Alexei Grinbaum (2007) summarizes the kind
of explanatory reasoning that is supported by such theories, in the following way:
“- Why is it so?, 
- Because we derived it.”.
Contra Grinbaum, I will argue that a mere mathematical derivation does not account for the
main and novel  epistemic  contribution provided by ARQIT explanations.  In  this  section I  will
provide a preliminary analysis of such a contribution, which will establish the basic features that an
adequate account of explanation in ARQIT will have to account for.
Researchers  working in  the  field  of  information-theoretic  physics  often insist  that  quantum
information theory implies a new perspective in our understanding of non-local entanglement “as a
new kind of non-classical resource that could be exploited, rather than an embarrassment to be
explained away” (Bub 2015). However, what is typically considered the most urgent foundational
problem of quantum non-locality consists in describing the processes underlying the occurrence of
quantum correlations. As such, the explanation of quantum correlations is part and parcel of the
question 'how could the world be such that it behaves the way QT predicts?'. Under the minimal
phenomenological interpretation of Shannon (and von Neumann) information as a measure of the
amount  of  correlation  between  variables,  an  information-theoretic  description  of  quantum
correlations remains completely uninformative about how such correlations come about (Timpson
2013). Such a description in fact leaves open even the question of what kind of non-locality is
involved here: merely apparent non-locality, as in Everettian interpretations, or a strong kind of
non-locality, as in Bohmian theories.
Within the interpretation tradition, the switch of perspective suggested in the above quotation
might therefore seem quite unhelpful – merely a way to replace the quest for a genuine explanation
of phenomena with different, instrumentalist and technologically motivated questions (e.g. 'how can
we use entanglement for information transfer tasks?'). 
However, an exclusive focus on the way QIT deals with questions whose natural locus is the
interpretation program might cause one to miss the real novel explanatory contribution of ARQIT,
of which some philosophers have instead caught a glance. For instance, in his brilliant book on
quantum information theory and the foundations of QT, Timpson observes that: “[y]es, we would
understand more about quantum mechanics when the measurement problem (etc.) were resolved;
but we would also understand more about quantum mechanics if we were to know where the theory
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lies within a sufficiently broad space of physical theories of interestingly different kinds.” (2013, p.
186).
As this passage suggests, one of the pivotal epistemic contributions of ARQITs is to generate
just  such  a  comparative  understanding  –  an  adequate  account  of  explanation  of  ARQIT must
therefore implement this kind of contribution. Focusing on this kind of understanding allows to see
how ARQIT does not only address instrumentalist concerns and how, on the contrary, the central
concerns of ARQIT are crucial questions in the foundations of QT, “those [questions] that have lain
close to the heart of anyone interested in the foundations of quantum mechanics, since its inception:
How does the quantum world differ from the classical [and postquantum,  I add] one?” (Timpson
2008, p.2).
Different answers have been given to this question. For Planck, the distinctive feature of QT is
the discretization of the energy levels of oscillators, for Bohr, it  is the discretization of angular
momentum, for de Broglie it is the wave nature of matter, for Schrödinger it is entanglement, for
Heisenberg, it is the non-commutativity of the algebra of observables, and so on to indeterminism,
superposition etc. According to John Wheeler the quantum principle was like the 'Merlin principle'
the magician who could change form when pursued (Largeault et al. 1980).
Axiomatic reconstructions of QT address the question 'how does the quantum differ from the
classical?'  with  the  analytical  tool  of  the  axiomatization  of  the  theory,  which  carries  with  it
significant advantages. On the one hand, in fact, the axiomatic method provides a more objective
and intersubjective standard for the evaluation of proposals: the core of QT is represented by the
axioms of the best axiomatization of QT – where axiomatizations are evaluated according to typical
standards  (simplicity,  comprehensiveness,  informativity).  On  the  other  hand,  the  fact  that  a
reconstruction  is  based  on  phenomenological  principles  whose  meaning  is  easily  accessible  to
scientists' understanding allows abstracting from possibly controversial features of the theory and
guarantees more intersubjectivity in the understanding of the meaning of each of its elements. 
In  addition,  ARQIT possesses  a  powerful  abstracting tool,  i.e.  the notion of information as
quantified by Shannon and von Neumann. We have seen that measures of information quantify the
amount of correlation between variables, while abstracting from the constitution of the systems
realizing, and from the processes yielding, such correlations. A description of the structure of reality
in  terms  of  information-processing  protocols,  therefore,  allows  an  ontologically  neutral  but
quantitatively precise description of the world in terms of the correlations between systems. Under
these premises, a characterization of QT in terms of information-theoretic principles leads credence
to the claim that the distinctive core of QT with respect to other theories lays in the specific kind of
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correlations that quantum systems realize.  These considerations lead to another conclusion about
the features of ARQIT explanations, which emerge exactly from such a new approach to the inquiry
on the quantum world. 
As I have said before, in the program of the interpretation of QT the main issue about non-
locality  consists  in  the explanation of how the correlations come about.  In such a context,  the
question  'why  is  the  quantum world  non-local?'  does  not  receive  much  attention,  while  some
philosophers even argue that one should not expect to find an explanation to this question (e.g. Egg
and Esfeld  2014).  Contrary to  this  conclusion,  ARQITs can address  questions  like  'why is  the
quantum world non-local?', or 'why is our world only this much non-local?'. 
Returning to the discussion of the explanation of non-locality, if describing the world in terms of
information processing allows us to isolate the features of QT that characterize the quantum against
the classical world, then investigating non-locality in terms of the possibilities that it  opens for
information transfer highlights the way in which non-locality is linked to the very distinctive feature
of the quantum world. But if this is so, then the way ARQIT's explanation works reflects a very
intuitive and straightforward pre-theoretic sense of explanation, that is that one explains a feature
or a behaviour P of s by showing how P depends on the 'essence' of s. According to the CBH
reconstruction,  therefore,  non-local  entanglement  is  explained  as  depending  on  the  two  no-go
principles  'no  broadcasting'  and  'no  superluminal  information  transfer'.  In  the  PR  boxes
reconstruction, instead, non-locality is itself part of the distinctive feature of QT and the specificity
of quantum non-locality depends on the conjunction with two other principles: 'no signalling' and
'non-trivial communication complexity'.
 In what follows, I will propose an alternative account of explanation that successfully mirrors
the above-seen pre-theoretical sense of explanation and accounts for the way in which this kind of
comparative understanding is achieved.
5. An account of explanation in ARQIT
It could be claimed that the mere derivation, or unification of quantum phenomena under a few
information-theoretic  principles and a  coherent  formal  structure already counts as  a  Deductive-
Nomological explanation, or as an explanation by unification (Kitcher 1981). For instance, Flores
(1999) characterizes explanations in theories of principle7 (and therefore in ARQITs) as providing
7 The now well-known distinction between theories of principle and constructive theories was originally drawn by
Einstein: ”We can distinguish various kinds of theories in physics. Most of them are constructive. They attempt to
build up a picture of the more complex phenomena out of the materials of a relativity simple formal scheme from
which they  start  out.  Along with this  most important  class  of  theories  there exists  a  second, which I will  call
‘principle-theories.’ These employ the analytic, not synthetic, method. The elements which form their basis and
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explanations by unification. However, neither the Deductive-Nomological, nor the Unificationist
approach capture the specific contribution of  ARQIT in the understanding of the quantum world.
Such accounts of explanation, in fact, neglect both the comparative kind of understanding provided
by ARQIT, and the fact that non-locality is explained by showing how it depends on what I called,
in a pre-theoretic anticipation, the 'essence' of QT. That the Unificationist account cannot exhaust
the explanatory contribution of ARQIT was already argued for instance in (van Camp 2011). Here it
is argued that the most important explanatory contribution to be expected from ARQITs is that they
delineate the preconditions for a (constructive) explanation of quantum phenomena. As argued by
van Camp, the Unificationist (and, I add, the Deductive-Nomological) model, cannot account for
this explanatory work. Although I agree with the analysis put forward by van Camp, I think that this
is just part of the story and that the explanatory contribution provided by ARQIT goes beyond
showing  “that  quantum  mechanics  requires  conceptual  clarification  at  a  foundational  level,
determine in what respect it is required, and that its principles are ones which are constitutive of a
coherent theoretical and conceptual framework whereby meaningful explanation is made possible.”
(van Camp 2011, p.9). As I will argue, ARQIT does not merely provide a sense of understanding,
nor  a  heuristic  guide  for  the  achievement  of  the  genuine  explanation  (provided  only  by  a
constructive interpretation of QT), but it provides genuine and self-contained explanations of some
aspects of quantum non-locality.
5.1 The bare bones
In developing the details of my account, I take inspiration from the account of explanatory proof
in mathematics formulated by Mark Steiner (1978).8 Although Steiner's account was developed as
an account of explanations in pure mathematics, its central idea that “to explain the behavior of an
entity, one deduces the behavior from the essence or nature of the entity” (Steiner 1978, p.143),
captures what I believe is the main explanatory content of ARQIT.9 In his account Steiner replaces
the notion of essence with the notion of characterising property, defined as a “property unique to a
given entity or structure within a family or domain of such entities or structures” (Steiner 1978,
p.143). According to Steiner's account, an explanatory proof: 
starting-point are not hypothetically constructed but empirically discovered ones, general characteristics of natural
processes,  principles  that  give  rise  to  mathematically  formulated  criteria  which  the  separate  processes  or  the
theoretical representations of them have to satisfy” (Einstein, 1919, p. 228).
8 Steiner's account has received criticisms as a theory of explanation in mathematics (e.g. (Resnik and Kushner 1987)
and (Hafner and Mancosu 2005)). Such objections question the validity of Steiner's account as a universal account
of mathematical explanation. Here, I do not defend either the universality, or the applicability in mathematics of the
account, and for this reason I will not discuss these criticisms.
9 It could be said that the mathematical derivations I described are, in the end, explanations in the Hempelian sense of
mere derivation from Laws of Nature.  However,  being formulated as an account  of explanatory proofs  in pure
mathematics (where every proof, whether explicative or not, is a derivation!) Steiner's account has the virtue, which
will turn out very useful for my purposes, of showing what differentiates these accounts as explanatory in contrast
with any generic mathematical derivation.
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“makes reference to a characterizing property of an entity or structure mentioned
in the theorem, such that from the proof it is evident that the result depends on the
property. It must be evident, that is, that if I substitute in the proof a different object
of the same domain, the theorem collapses; more, I should be able to see as I vary
the object how the theorem changes in response. In effect, then, explanation is not
simply a relation between a proof and a theorem; rather, a relation between an array
of proofs and an array of theorems, where the proofs are obtained from one another
by the 'deformation' prescribed above.” (p.144)
It should be already intuitively clear how this definition also mirrors the explanations illustrated
in the previous sections.
First of all, the notion of characterising property, defined over a given family or domain, traces
the  comparative  kind  of  understanding  provided  by  ARQIT  explanations.  The  definition  of
characterising property  therefore  adequately  describes  the  (conjunction  of  the)  principles  of
ARQITs, whose function is to isolate QT against a family of theories. The conjunction of the three
CBH principles, for instance, isolates QT against the family of all theories representable with a C*-
algebra, which CBH take to neutrally represent all mainstream physical theories. The principles of
fantasy QT aim at discovering a set of principles (characterising properties) isolating QT against the
family of all (existing or imaginary) non-local theories that don't allow superluminal signalling. As
with Steiner's  characterising property,  ARQITs'  characterising principles are “a derivative notion,
since a given entity [theory] can be part of a number of differing domains or families. In fact, an
object [a theory] might be characterized variously if it belongs to distinct families. Even in a single
domain, entities [theories] may be characterized multiply” (ibid., 144).10 As we will see later in this
section, the derivative character of this notion makes it especially useful in accounting for the scale
of depth of ARQIT explanation.
Secondly, an essential part of the explanation consists in the derivation of the explanandum,
which, given the set of QT principles (or axioms), is shown to be a theorem of QT. For instance, the
explanation  of  non-local  entanglement  provided  by  the  CBH  reconstruction  consists  partly  in
making explicit how the existence of entangled states follows from 'no superluminal information
transfer'  and  'no broadcasting'.  In  the  case  of  non-local  boxes,  part  of  the explanation why no
stronger non-locality than quantum non-locality is instantiated in our world is constituted by the
derivation  of  a  contradiction  between  the  existence  of  non-quantum  correlations  and  a  third
(envisaged)  information-theoretic  principle  about  the  impossibility  of  a  world  where
communication complexity is trivial.
10 Notice however that the concept of axiomatizing principles for a theory and that of characterising property are 
logically distinct. A characterising property does not necessarily entail every feature of the characterized object. It  is 
sufficient that it isolate said object from the chosen family of reference. Not every characterising property, therefore, 
can play the role of a complete axiomatization of a theory.
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Finally, for the comprehensiveness of the explanation it is crucial to show how, by changing the
characteristic property, the theorem/explanandum changes in response.  As argued by Steiner, the
explanations of quantum non-locality provided by ARQITs do not only consist in the relation of
mathematical derivability between non-locality and the principles, but rather in “a relation between
an array of proofs and an array of theorems, where the proofs are obtained from one another by the
'deformation'  prescribed  above”  (ibid., p.143).  In  addition  to  this,  it  has  to  be  said  that  the
deformations of the principles that count as explanatory are not only those that lead to the derivation
of new theorems, but are also those that, due to the reaching of a contradiction, lead to blocked
derivations because the modified principles are incompatible. To include also these derivations in
our explanatory information, I complete Steiner's criterion with the addition that the explanation
also includes those modifications of the axioms that reach a contradiction and block the derivation
of a modified theorem.11
Notice that, once applied to the physics context, the array of derivations translates into a pattern
of  counterfactual  dependence between explanans and explanandum. More concretely,  under  the
account I am proposing, ARQIT's explanation provides a specific kind of 'what-if-things-had-been-
different'  knowledge,  where  the  counterfactual  claims  are  produced  by  changing  the  theory's
principles and exploring the kind of features that follow from such a deformation. In CBH, for
instance, if 'no broadcasting' is dropped, then one has a classical phase space theory, while if the 'no
superluminal information transfer' is dropped, one has a theory where distinct and distant physical
systems are not kinematically independent, i.e. a strongly non-local theory. In the case of PR non-
local boxes, the investigation of the models displaying non-locality and no superluminal signalling
shows that the theories constrained by these two principles display a range of non-local correlations
that go beyond those allowed by QT. In particular, once one considers the link between measure of
non-locality and communication complexity, it seems that post-quantum correlations (and, in turn,
any 'fantasy QT') would make communication complexity trivial. As noticed before, what-if-things-
had-been-different knowledge is provided also when the derivation of a theorem is blocked because
of  the  reaching  of  a  contradiction,  which  shows  that  such  a  specific  modification  of  the
characterising property is  not  possible.  For  instance,  in  the  case of  PR non-local  boxes  a  first
immediate result is that a toy model that displays non-locality and no signalling can't also display
complete determinism, otherwise the two axioms would be incompatible (Popescu and Rohrlich
1994, p. 380). 
I have claimed before that in the account here offered, ARQIT does not merely increase our
sense of understanding of QT, nor does it only play a heuristic function to guide the search for a
11 I am thankful to an anonymous referee for pointing out the necessity of this clarification.
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genuine explanation, but it provides genuine explanations. It is therefore necessary to write a few
words to justify this claim. First of all, many accounts of explanation currently tend to converge in
the claim that the core of a scientific explanation lies in the counterfactual dependence between
explanans  and explanandum.  Morrison (1999) for  instance  has  argued that  explanatory  models
exhibit a certain kind of structural dependence and, elaborating on this idea, Bokulich (2011) has
argued that this structural dependence should be articulated in terms of counterfactual dependence.
The same point has been made more recently by Reutlinger (2012) and Pincock (2014). The claim
that  information  about  counterfactual  dependence  is  at  the  core  of  scientific  explanation
encompasses  different  kinds  of  scientific  explanations,  among them also causal  or  mechanistic
explanation (Felline 2015). This is for instance clear in those theories of mechanisms that attribute a
central role to counterfactual dependence in the definition of a mechanism (Craver 2007, Glennan
2010). The same kind of counterfactual knowledge is provided by ARQIT explanation. In practice,
an ARQIT shows that if we lived in a world characterized by different quantum principles, then
non-locality would change in such and such a way.  The explanatory role of models is therefore
linked to the fact that they provide information about a pattern of counterfactual dependencies or, in
other words, they provide 'what-if-things-had-been-different' kind of information. 
Within this framework, the difference between ARQIT's and other kinds of explanations is to be
found in the different 'origin' of such a counterfactual dependence (Bokulich 2011). For instance, in
a mechanistic explanation the explanandum counterfactually depends on a mechanical property of
the explanans,  via a relation of causal production. To make an example, the speed of my car is
explained as depending on my pushing of the accelerator pedal, via the mechanical details of the
motor inside the car, its intermediate components, their behavior and interactions. In an ARQIT,
non-locality is explained as depending on the information-theoretic principles axiomatizing QT, via
a relation of mathematical dependence between the formal representative of non-locality and the
formal representatives of the information-theoretic principles.
Finally,  although I  am not  going to  push this  last  point,  the  formulation of  the  relation of
explanatory relevance as a relation between the formal representatives of the explanans and the
explanandum suggests that the most natural conceptual framework where to locate such an account
of explanation is the epistemic view of scientific explanation. I take the latter as the view according
to which a scientific explanation is a finite class of operations (inferences and other 'movements' of
thoughts) on representations whose aim is to enrich our knowledge of an explanandum (Wright,
manuscript)
A comprehensive understanding of the specific features of this kind of explanation requires a
thorough investigation of the notion of  characterising property. In the rest  of this section I will
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underline some interesting features of this notion and neutralize two potential  objections to the
account of explanation here proposed.
5.2 Two potential objections neutralized
We have seen that ARQIT explains by deriving the explanandum from a characterising property
and making explicit the counterfactual dependence between such a characterising property and the
explanandum. We have also seen, however, that the same theory can have different characterising
properties depending on the family over which the  characterising property is defined (it  is also
possible that the same theory has more than one  characterising property to isolate it against the
same family). As a consequence, the same explanandum might have different potential explanations
based  on  different  characterising properties:  depending  on  the  family  against  which  QT  is
characterized we could obtain different explanations of, say, entanglement. This raises the issue of
multiplying explanations of the same explanandum and therefore the problem of evaluating which
one is the best explanation. I argue, however, that this does not represent a pernicious problem for
the proposed account of explanation, as it provides all the necessary tools for defining a sufficiently
objective scale of depth for the evaluation of different explanations. 
The rule that a world with fewer brute facts is more understandable than a world with more
applies here as in virtually any variety of scientific explanation. In this sense, unification is a virtue
of ARQIT's explanation, rather than its core: other things being equal, an explanation starting with
fewer assumptions (and therefore a simpler characterising property) is to be considered better than
one  with  more.  The  first  feature  that  influences  the  depth  of  an  explanation  is  therefore  the
simplicity of the characterising property.
In  order  to  appreciate  a  second  (probably  more  interesting)  element  that  influences  the
explanatory power of ARQIT's explanation, consider the way such explanations work, namely by
providing a kind of counterfactual knowledge. It follows from this that the kind of counterfactual
information provided by the explanation affects the explanatory power of this explanation. In turn,
the kind of counterfactual information provided by an ARQIT depends on the framework against
which the theory is characterized (i.e. the family over which the characterising property is defined),
as that family constrains the space of possibilities that are investigated with the modification of the
characterising property. For instance, the generality of the family and its neutrality are features that
influence the significance of the explanation: on the one hand, the more general the domain defining
the space of possibilities, the more counterfactual information you can get; on the other hand, if the
family of reference is more neutral,  the space of possibilities explored is less 'informed' by the
selection of the family, and more physically significant relations of dependence can be captured by
the deformation of the  characterising properties.  As an illustration of how the neutrality of the
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family  of  reference  influences  the  depth  of  an  explanation,  think  about  the  case  of  the  CBH
reconstruction. We have seen how the choice of C*-algebra might be too strong, as it rules out by
fiat an interesting class of theories (deterministic hidden variable theories). Furthermore, we have
seen how, as a consequence of such an a priori selection of the family of reference, the claim that in
the  CBH  characterization  theorem  the  information-theoretic  principles  characterize  QT  is
significantly reduced in scope. In this sense, an explanation showing how to deduce non-locality
from the two axioms in the family of theories representable by a C*-algebra has less physical
significance, and is less informative about the origin of non-locality, than an explanation using a
more neutral framework.
This paper about explanation in ARQIT can't exhaust all the features that might contribute to the
explanatory depth of an ARQIT – a thorough analysis of this point would risk overshadowing other
elements of this proposal. However, the elements here outlined should be sufficient to support the
claim that the potential multiplicity of explanations in ARQIT is not problematic, as the account
outlines a clear and intersubjective way of evaluating and confronting explanations. Finally, notice
that  the  same  elements  that  contribute  to  a  better  explanation  (simplicity,  comprehensiveness,
informativity)  are  mirrored  by  the  elements  that  contribute  to  the  physical  significance  of
axiomatizations. The search for the best axiomatization of QT, therefore, goes hand in hand with the
search for the best explanation.
There is another interesting consequence of the illustrated multiplication of explanations that
deserves some attention. Consider that, in the same way as ARQITs single out QT with information-
theoretic principles,  we can also envisage the possibility of an axiomatization that reverses this
order.  For  example,  we  can  imagine  an  axiomatic  system  where,  contrarily  to  the  CBH
reconstruction, the existence of entangled states is part of the axioms and 'no broadcasting' or 'no
superluminal information transfer' are among the theorems. In general, while in the illustrated case
studies a feature of QT is explained by appeal to information-theoretic principles, at the same time
the proposed account allows as potential explanation also a derivation that reverses the explanatory
order.
This consequence might seem disturbing – a replica of the problem of asymmetry originally
formulated in the context of the DN and successively of the Unificationist model. However, as with
the multiplication of explanations just analysed, this feature does not represent a problem for the
account  of  explanation I  am advocating.  Take the  well-known example  of  the flagpole  and its
shadow. In this example, the problem of asymmetry consists in the fact that, according to the DN
(and the Unificationist) account, the length of a flagpole could explain the length of its shadow, as
well as the other way around. On the other hand, while the height of a flagpole can clearly be used
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to  explain the length of its  shadow, the opposite  explanation seems highly counterintuitive.  An
accredited diagnosis of the problem is that the analysis of this case misses the fact that the most
natural explanation to ask for—of  both the length of the shadow, and the height of the flagpole—is
an explanation of  how the shadow (or  the  flagpole)  is  produced in  that  specific  length,  and is
therefore a causal explanation. Since causality is an asymmetrical relation, it therefore follows that
if a causally explains b, then b cannot causally explain a. This asymmetry, though, is not a feature
of  the  generic  explanation,  but  originates  with  the  (implicit)  quest  for  a  causal  explanation  –
causality being therefore the origin of the asymmetry.
It  might be objected at  this point, that this limited example does not prove that there is no
objective generic explanatory direction from the length of the flagpole to the length of the shadow.
It might be that such an a priori explanatory direction exists and corresponds to the causal direction.
This conjecture, however, has been already proven wrong. Take, for instance, the analysis of this
same counterexample  by  Bas Van Fraassen,  where  the  question 'why the  flagpole  is  so  long?'
requires a functional explanation. In this case, the explanation is that the flagpole was built with the
aim of casting a shadow of that exact  length. In this version of the example,  the length of the
shadow is the explanans and the length of the flagpole is the explanandum, contradicting the claim
that there is an objective explanatory arrow independent of the kind of explanation requested.
It can be said, therefore, that there are no reasons to assume that when a explains b, b cannot a
priori explain  a, but that such an asymmetry might instead be determined by the specific kind of
explanatory relation that informs the explanation.
This being said, is asymmetry also a feature of the kind of explanation of non-locality provided
by ARQIT? As we already know at this point, the answer to this question is 'no'. I have said that
explanations  provided  by  ARQITs  (of  'why  non-local  entanglement?'  or  'why  this  much  non-
locality?') explain by showing how the explanandum is a consequence of the characterising property
of QT. We have also seen that the  characterising property is a derivative notion. A theory can be
characterized against a number of domains or families of theories. Even in a single family, theories
may be characterized multiply. In particular, it might be that there are reconstructions where the
existence  of  non-local  entanglement  is  part  of  the  axioms,  and 'no broadcasting'  is  part  of  the
theorems. Contrarily to  the notion of cause or of function,  there is  no feature  in  the notion of
characterising property that implies asymmetry, in the sense of a priori forbidding cases where the
explanandum of one explanation become part of the explanans, and the explanans the explanandum.
Notice however, that the fact that our account does not need to discriminate a priori between a
explaining b and b explaining a does not imply that such two potential explanations must be both
accepted.  It  only  means  that  the  question  of  what  is  the  correct explanation  is  a  matter  of
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investigation,  which depends on what the best axiomatization is, with the criteria that we have
already seen.
6. ARQIT, ontology, and the interpretation of QT 
So far  I  have  provided  an  account  of  what  kind  of  explanatory  gain  we can  expect  from
ARQITs.  The main point of the previous section is that  ARQITs can aspire at providing genuine
explanations of some aspects of quantum non-locality. The aim of this section is to illustrate how
such a claim can contribute to debates in the foundations of QT.
The significance of ARQIT in the foundations of physics has been articulated in a variety of
different claims, each of which require a detailed and specific examination. In this section I will
take into account and analyse specifically two claims.
A  first  assumption,  perhaps  vague  but  nonetheless  intuitively  strong,  is  that  ARQIT's
explanatory power must witness the special role that the structure of information, as constrained by
the principles, must have in the ontology of QT, or that such explanatory power witnesses that QT is
about quantum information, or even that, if QT is a fundamental theory, then “every item of the
physical world has at  bottom—at very deep bottom, in most instances— an immaterial  source”
(Wheeler 1990, p.35). The plausibility of this claim is probably reinforced by the unificatory power
of the explanations provided by ARQIT. At a first sight, the intuitive idea of subsuming the structure
of QT under few independent principles might seem the most concrete realization of the quest for
the content of QT.
This conclusion, though, is unnecessary in order to account for the explanatory power of ARQIT
and therefore, if we limit ourselves to considerations related to scientific explanation in ARQIT,
unwarranted.
In order to understand why this is so, think again about the role of the principles in ARQITs'
explanations of non-locality.  First  of all,  they have to isolate QT with respect to  the family of
theories represented by C*-algebras – this function can be played by the principles without any
foundational meaning. Secondly, they must logically (mathematically) imply the explanandum –
they can do so, independently of the role of information in the foundations of QT. Finally, the
explanation must show how the explanandum changes when the principles change – also in such a
kind of counterfactual reasoning the ontological status of information plays no role.
In  conclusion,  this  explanation  can  work  even  under  a  minimal
phenomenological/instrumentalist interpretation of information. If we accept the provided account
of the explanatory power of ARQIT, therefore, such an explanatory power is not to be cashed out in
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terms  of  a  privileged  ontological  role  of  information-theoretic  principles  (aka  characterising
property) with respect to the derived structure of QT.
In order  to  see  how this  conclusion is  essentially  dependent  on the account  of  explanation
assumed, it is interesting to see how different accounts of explanations might lead to an opposite
conclusion about the ontological significance of information theoretic principles.
One  way  of  accounting  for  the  explanatory  power  of  principles  and  for  their  role  in  the
explanation of other Laws of Nature, developed notably in (Lange 2011, 2013), is to ground such a
role in metaphysical assumptions. According to Lange's metaphysics of Laws, natural necessity is
hierarchically structured. A higher place in such a metaphysical hierarchy allows some Laws of
Nature to act as constraints over other Laws of Nature. A constraint can explain the structure of
lower-level Laws (and therefore phenomena that are instantiations of such a structure) because they
show that such a structure is not accidental, but there is some sort of necessity in it. For instance,
conservation laws are more necessary than dynamical laws, and therefore the former can explain the
latter's structure. As a result of this strategy, Lange's account of the explanatory power of principles
heavily depends on his metaphysical account of Laws and Necessity. If applied to ARQIT, such an
account would imply that the explanatory role of information-theoretic principles with respect to the
structure of QT would be conditional on their modal, metaphysical priority. To be sure, this would
not necessarily imply claims such as that the physical world is made of information – however, it
would surely warrant a heavily ontologically charged interpretation of Shannon information as a
fundamental constituent of the physical world.
The evaluation of Lange's  metaphysical  account  is  outside the scope of this paper.  Here,  it
suffices to say that the analysis I have proposed of the explanatory power of principles does not rely
on specific metaphysical assumptions but rather focuses on the role of constraints as delineating an
epistemic necessity. This, it has to be said, does not imply any straightforward conflict with Lange's
metaphysical background – however it does not even require such a background.
Some philosophers take a stronger stance about the significance of ARQIT and maintain that, as
a consequence of ARQIT, the search for a traditional interpretation of QT should be abandoned.
Grinbaum (2007), for instance, describes a neat contrast between the two programs and argues that
the shift to the reconstruction program should correspond to an abandonment of the interpretational
program.  The  arguments  he  displays  to  support  such  a  conclusion  make  appeal  to  broad
considerations  about  the  aims of  physics  and its  relationship  with  philosophy.  Although I  find
Grinbaum’s arguments objectionable, I will not discuss them, as such broad arguments are outside
the scope of this paper. In this section I will only evaluate the conjecture of the disjunctive relation
between ARQIT and interpretation in terms of its consequences in the domain of explanation.
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CBH (2003) have put  this idea in especially clear and useful terms, by saying that ARQIT
makes an  interpretation  of  QT in  terms  of  the  behaviour  of  particles  and waves  'explanatorily
irrelevant'.  In this section I  test  the  acceptability  of  such a  claim in the limited domain of the
explanation of non-locality. I will therefore ask the question: can the ARQIT explanation of non-
locality  replace  or  screen-off  an  explanation  of  non-locality  as  provided  by  a  traditional
interpretation of QT?12
If we consider what has been said so far about ARQITs' explanations, then the answer to the
above question should be negative: interpretations of QT address the explanation of non-locality as
the question of how quantum correlations occur – the problem lying in the difficulty of providing a
description of how the world is to be made in order to yield the correlations.  The explanation of
how a phenomenon occurs is usually taken to require an account in 'mechanical', 'dynamical' or
more  generically  'causal'  (in  the  sense  of  productive  causation)  terms.  The  large  majority  of
philosophers of physics argue that correlations should be explained in such a way, although the
constantly growing material produced since the origins of QT in the attempt to formulate a causal
account of quantum correlations has not yet achieved much consensus. Clearly, such an explanation
cannot be given in terms of information.
However, causal explanation is not the only explanation-how. A possible alternative is to reject
the assumption that quantum correlations should be explained causally and acknowledge that they
should be explained 'structurally'. A structural explanation is an explanation where the explanandum
is shown to be an instantiation of a fundamental structure of the world, rather than produced by
some underlying  processes  (Dorato  and Felline  2011,  Felline  2011).  Basically,  this  explanation
shows  that  the  explanandum  is  'what  happens  when  nothing  happens'.  The  most  well  known
example of a structural explanation is the explanation of length contraction in the special theory of
relativity, where the former is explained by showing how it is not the result of a process undergone
by material bodies, but rather an instantiation of the geometric structure of space–time, the latter
being not Euclidean as previously expected, but Minkowskian.
The parallel with explanations in special relativity and in ARQIT was already proposed in CBH
(2003)  paper  and  has  since  then  been  central  in  Bub's  work.  Even  Bub's  most  recent  work
exemplifies that something similar to a structural explanation is at the centre of his conjecture about
explanation  in  ARQIT:  “the  conceptual  revolution  in  the  transition  from  classical  to  quantum
physics should be understood as resting on the recognition that there is an information-theoretic
structure to the mosaic of events, and this structure is not what Shannon thought it was” (Bub 2015,
12 Considerations of this kind are extraneous to the literature devoted to PR boxes. This latter case study, therefore, will
be left out of the discussion of this chapter.
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p. 6).
If we follow such a conjecture, non-local quantum correlations, therefore, might be explained
structurally as an instantiation of the structure of information that is  not Shannon-like,  but von
Neumann-like.
In  order  for  the  structure of  information  to  provide  a  structural  explanation,  however,  it  is
necessary to go beyond the minimal phenomenological interpretation of information, and show that
such a structure is fundamental in the sense that, as the geometry of spacetime, it is not explainable
with,  or  inferable  from,  the  dynamical  or  constitutive  details  of  underlying particles  or  waves.
Under the assumption that the structure of information is a fundamental structure (in the sense just
explained) ARQIT can explain quantum phenomena  as being the instantiation of a fundamental
structure of the world. Also, it follows that no interpretation of QT in terms of particles or waves
can  provide  another  deeper  explanation  than  this  one  exploiting  the  fundamental  structure  of
information.  On  the  contrary,  without  the  assumption  that  the  structure  of  information  is  a
fundamental  structure,  there  is  always  the  possibility  of  a  more  fundamental  story  that
infers/explains the structure of correlations, and we are back to square one. If such story is possible,
then it has to provide an answer to the question: how quantum correlations come about?
Philosophers have taken different approaches to show that the structure of information indeed
possesses such a fundamental status. 
A first notable strategy is represented by the philosophical approach to quantum information
theory  called  ‘information  immaterialism’  (Zeilinger  1999),  according  to  which quantum
information is “the basic category from which all else flows” (Timpson 2010, p.209). The advocates
of this view interpret the claim that the quantum state is about quantum information as the claim
that information (the immaterial) is the fundamental subject matter of physical theory. Under the
assumption  that  the  world  is,  at  its  bottom,  information,  the  information-theoretic  description
provided  by  ARQIT  ceases  to  represent  a  mere  tool  for  the  quantification  of  the  amount  of
correlation between unknown systems (and result of unknown processes) and represents instead the
most fundamental description of the reality underlying said correlations.  According to this view,
other explanations of quantum phenomena in terms of particles or waves, collapse or non-collapse
of the wave-function, are therefore ruled out as competitors of this account.
The ontological picture implied by information immaterialism still needs to be clearly spelled
out and this makes a meaningful assessment of this strategy especially difficult. Some criticisms, in
particular, seem to be hard to overcome. Among others, Timpson (2010, 2013) argues that this view
rests  on  a  conflation  between  the  epistemic  sense  of  information  and  the  physical  sense  of
information proper of Shannon information.
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Like Zeilinger, also CBH argue that the conceptual problems of QT dissolve once one is ready
to take the right philosophical lesson from quantum information theory: interpreting the quantum
state as quantum information and taking the structure of information as fundamental. However, their
argument (put forward in (Clifton et al. 2003) and elaborated more in detail in the succeeding work
of Bub (2000, 2004, 2005)) is an epistemological argument rather than an ontological one.  The
CBH argument has influenced the debate over the philosophical meaning of ARQIT and more in
general of quantum information theory in a way that goes beyond the significance of the CBH
theorem itself. The details of such philosophical arguments deserve therefore a careful attention.
The way CBH argue for this  conclusion is  to conjecture  that the CBH theorem makes any
constructive mechanical interpretation of quantum theory in principle empirically underdetermined.
In Bub's own words:
“You can, if  you like,  tell  a mechanical  story about quantum phenomena (via
Bohm’s theory, for example) but such a story, if constrained by the information-
theoretic principles, can have no excess empirical content over quantum mechanics,
and  the  additional  non-quantum  structural  elements  will  be  explanatorily
superfluous” (Bub, 2005, p. 14).
 As a consequence, the rational epistemological stance is to reject any such interpretation as
unacceptable,  interpret QT as a theory of principle about the possibilities and impossibilities of
information transfer  and regard quantum information as  a  physical  primitive  (Bub, 2004).  Bub
devoted much of his subsequent work to the attempt to deepen and strengthen the claim that the
CBH theorem made any constructive interpretation of QT empirically underdetermined; however,
many philosophers criticize this claim. Besides the already mentioned (Timpson 2013) here it is
worth mentioning that Duwell (2007) provides a careful survey and analysis of different arguments
made by Bub to the conclusion that the CBH theorem makes information a physical primitive and
rejects them. In another notable paper Hagar and Hemmo (2006) argue that quantum information
theory is an essentially incomplete theory of quantum phenomena, requiring a further account in
terms of a constructive QT with a clear solution of the measurement problem. Notice that their
objection applies also to Zeilinger's  immaterialism and in general to any 'black box' account of
quantum  phenomena.  An  interpretation  of  QT with  a  determinate  stance  with  respect  to  the




To sum up, the story here outlined has a positive and a negative side.
On  the  positive  side,  ARQIT  can  provide  a  genuine  explanatory  contribution  to  our
understanding of quantum phenomena. Such an explanatory contribution does not merely consist in
its  heuristic  role  in  the  achievement  of  the  (genuinely  explanatory)  constructive  quantum
mechanical theory, nor does it merely consist in answering technologically motivated questions. On
the contrary, ARQIT's explanations aim at providing direct answers to questions that are central in
the foundations of physics.
On the  negative  side,  I  have  argued  that  such  explanations  do  not  exhaust  the  number  of
questions  that  arise  from  the  investigation  of  quantum  phenomena.  Against  the  enthusiastic
advocates  of  the  'paradigm  shift'  (Grinbaum  2007),  the  analysis  proposed  of  the  kinds  of
explanations  provided  by  ARQITs  still  leaves  space  for  an  explanatory  contribution  by  the
interpretative program. In CBH terminology: ARQIT does not make a mechanical quantum theory
explanatorily superfluous.
One of the main virtues of the philosophy of scientific explanation when applied to significant
cases  studies  is  its  potential  to clarify important  features of  such case studies and therefore to
contribute to open issues in the foundations of physics. In this paper, I have provided a small sample
of  how  such  a  contribution  might  work  –  it  would  therefore  be  incautious  to  draw  general
conclusions  about  QIT and  the  interpretation  of  QT.  However,  it  is  still  useful  to  outline  the
direction where the analysis so far is pointing to.
The lesson that I take from what has been said here is that the explanatory role of information is
much different than often implicitly assumed with scientific explanations, where the explanatory
role of an entity (structure, property, law...) is typically taken to reflect a significant role in the
ontology.  On  the  contrary,  the  explanatory  role  of  information  consists  partly  in  providing  an
ontologically  neutral  but  quantitatively  precise  framework  for  the  description  of  quantum
correlations. But the explanatory role of information as a structure of probabilistic correlations also
consists in picking up the specificity of QT against other classes of theories. The fact that QT can be
characterized  with  few  information-theoretic  principles  supports  therefore  the  claim  that  the
distinctive core of QT with respect  to classical  mechanics lies  within the different  structure of
probabilistic  correlations.  On  the  other  hand,  the  fact  that  the  explanation  of  some  quantum
phenomena still requires an interpretation in terms of particles and waves, providing a solution of
the measurement problem seems to witness against the claim that QT is about quantum information.
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